Coordinating to protect the global climate : experimental evidence on the role of inequality and commitment by Tavoni, Alessandro et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-049
Coordinating to Protect 
the Global Climate: 
Experimental Evidence on the Role 
of Inequality and Commitment
Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, 
and Andreas Löschel
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-049
Coordinating to Protect 
the Global Climate: 
Experimental Evidence on the Role 
of Inequality and Commitment
Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, 
and Andreas Löschel
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10049.pdf
Non-technical summary
In the aftermath of the climate conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 (15th
Conference of the Parties of the United Nations), two issues appear to have played a
determinant role in the negotiation discourse in protecting the global climate. First,
different views on fairness considerations in sharing the burden of the greenhouse
gas mitigation costs: Developed countries are historically the main contributors to
climate change, while in some newly industrializing economies, notably China, emis-
sions grow at an unprecedented rate. What is a fair way to share the responsibilities
among developing and developed countries in the containment of global emissions? In
international climate policy, different notions of equity have been proposed supported
by different countries. The lack of consensus on equity principles has informed much
of the exchanges between the United States and China. These two largest emitters
worldwide have managed to stay clear of binding commitments to date. Second,
coordination difficulties are displayed by the many participants to the climate nego-
tiations: The Copenhagen Accord has introduced a nonbinding “pledge and review”
mechanism where individual countries define voluntary emission reduction targets to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions before 2020. Can this emergent institution prove
successful as a first stage to achieve the required global coordination?
Against this background, this paper is concerned with the drivers of coopera-
tion among groups of unrelated individuals faced with a coordination game requiring
multilateral effort in order to reach a target and avoid losses to all members. Free
riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes of cooperation
breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are particularly severe in
the absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of sanctioning deviant behav-
ior. A growing literature however stresses the importance of non-economic factors
in explaining human behavior; therefore, instruments that go beyond the traditional
incentives might prove effective in facilitating the task.
Given the empirical nature of the problem, we address it by means of a controlled
laboratory experiment. To this end, we extend an experiment regarding a framed
threshold public goods game with distinctive elements such as inequality and com-
mitment as salient features of the ongoing debate over how best to share the “common
but differentiated responsibilities” of climate change. We have built upon the game
proposed by Milinski et al. (2008) to explore these further aspects that were not
captured by the original design, and that we deem important both at the theoretical
and policy level. The experimental results show that the real-world features intro-
duced in the game have deep consequences on the cooperation level. Both claims that
the inequality disrupts and the commitments help coordination are supported by the
data. Thereby the experiment clearly shows the conditions under which subjects effec-
tively coordinate their efforts to avoid the climate catastrophe: All successful groups
agreed on a common equity notion and eliminated inequality while failing groups of-
ten disagreed about the reduction of inequality. In that context, the announcement
of unbinding targets is particularly helpful to solve the coordination problem.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In der letzten Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen im Dezember 2009 (15. Conference of
Parties of the United Nations) haben zwei Dinge eine entscheidende Rolle für den
Verhandlungsverlauf gespielt: Erstens, unterschiedliche Ansichten über die Anwen-
dung von Fairnessprinzipien zur Verteilung der Lasten des Klimaschutzes: Die Indus-
trieländer sind hauptverantwortlich für die historischen Treibhausgasemissionen. In
den rasant wachsenden Schwellenländern wie China steigen die Emissionen jedoch in
einem nie da gewesenen Tempo. Was wäre angesichts dieser Entwicklungen eine faire
Verteilung der Lasten? In den Klimaverhandlungen haben unterschiedliche Länder
sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die faire Verteilung. Dieser fehlende Kon-
sens spiegelt sich sehr deutlich in den Position der beiden größten Emittenten, die
Vereinigten Staaten und China, wider, die sich beide bislang geweigert haben, einem
verbindlichen internationalen Abkommen beizutreten. Zweitens, im Nachgang von
Kopenhagen haben viele Länder konkrete Reduktionsziele verkündet, welche jedoch
unverbindlich sind. Hier stellt sich die Frage, ob diese unverbindlichen Ankündigungen
die Koordination der nationalen Anstrengungen zur Lösung des globalen Klimaprob-
lems verbessern können.
Vor diesem Hintergrund beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Arbeit mit den Determi-
nanten von Kooperation in einer Situation, in der sich eine Gruppe von Individuen
auf ein Ziel koordinieren muss, um einen Verlust für alle Mitglieder zu vermeiden.
Freifahreranreize und Koordinierungsprobleme werden als die Hauptursache für das
Scheitern internationaler Kooperation angesehen, vor allem wenn keine glaubwürdi-
gen Bestrafungsmechanismen bei abweichendem Verhalten zur Verfügung stehen. Die
verhaltensökonomische Literatur hat jedoch auch gezeigt, dass Menschen sich nicht
immer gemäß der Standardtheorie verhalten und dass auch nicht-ökonomische Anreize
einen Effekt auf Koordination und Kooperation haben können.
Da es sich hierbei vor allem um empirische Fragen handelt, nutzen wir für die
Analyse ein ökonomisches Laborexperiment. Dieses baut auf einem Öffentlichen-Gut-
Spiel mit Zielschwellenwert von Milinski et al. (2008) auf und erweitert es um zwei
Aspekte, die in der Klimapolitik eine zentrale Rolle spielen: Erstens unterscheiden sich
die Akteure hinsichtlich ihres Vermögens und ihrer Verantwortung hinsichtlich ihrer
historischen Emissionen. Zweitens haben die Akteure die Möglichkeit unverbindliche
Reduktionsziele zu verkünden. Das Experiment bestätigt die theoretischen Hypothe-
sen: Die Ankündigung von Reduktionszielen fördert und die Ungleichheit erschwert
die Koordinations- und Kooperationsfähigkeit. Die Ergebnisse zeigen dabei deutlich
die Bedingungen, die für effektive Koordination erfüllt sein müssen: Alle Gruppen,
die sich erfolgreich auf das vorgegebene Ziel koordiniert haben, einigten sich auf ein
gemeinsames Fairnessprinzip und lösten die vorhandene Ungleichheit komplett auf.
Gescheiterte Gruppen dagegen konnten sich oftmals nicht einigen, in welchem Maß
die vorhandene Ungleichheit vermindert werden sollte. In diesem Kontext war die
Möglichkeit, Reduktionsziele anzukündigen, sehr erfolgreich bei der Lösung des Ko-
ordinierungsproblems.
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Abstract
Free riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes
of cooperation breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are par-
ticularly severe in the absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of
sanctioning deviant behavior. Unfortunately, solutions to global environmental
dilemmas, like climate change, cannot depend on coercion mechanisms, given
the transnational effects of emissions. A further complication is that it yields
“common but differentiated responsibilities”. Such asymmetries in wealth and
carbon responsibilities among the actors, and the ensuing issues of equity, might
further impede cooperation. Yet, a growing literature stresses the importance
of non-economic factors in explaining human behavior; therefore, instruments
that go beyond the traditional incentives might prove effective in facilitating
the task. Given the empirical nature of the problem, we address it by means
of a controlled laboratory experiment: a framed threshold public goods game
is used to investigate the degree of cooperation and coordination achieved by
groups of six participants in combating simulated catastrophic climate change.
While necessarily simple for the sake of tractability, the game is designed to
incorporate key real-world issues, such as inequity and the impact of emergent
institutions based on nonbinding “pledge and review” mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 15th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations (COP
15), which took place in Copenhagen in December 2009, two issues appear to have
played a determinant role in the negotiation discourse in protecting the global climate.
First, different views on fairness considerations in sharing the burden of the green-
house gas (GHG) mitigation costs: Developed countries are historically the main
contributors to climate change, while in some newly industrializing economies, no-
tably China, GHG emissions grow at an unprecedented rate. What is a fair way to
share the responsibilities among developing and developed countries in the contain-
ment of global GHG emissions? In international climate policy, different notions of
equity have been proposed: For example, the egalitarian rule incorporates the prin-
ciple of equal per capita emissions, the sovereignty rule postulates the principle of
equal percentage reduction of current emissions, the polluter-pays rule incorporates
the principle of equal ratio between abatement costs and emissions, and the ability-
to-pay rule stipulates the principle of equal ratio between abatement costs and GDP.
The lack of consensus on equity principles has informed much of the United States-
China exchanges on who is to be the first mover in the emission reduction game.
Advocating the other country was to take the lead in terms of timing and magni-
tude of GHG reductions on the grounds of reciprocity considerations, the two largest
emitters worldwide (each accounts for roughly one fifth of energy related global CO2
emissions) have managed to stay clear of binding commitments to date.
Second, different proposals to achieve the global cooperation required by the global
warming problem given the strategic nature of the interactions between sovereign
countries that need to coordinate to resolve it. These coordination difficulties are
displayed by the many participants to the climate negotiations. The Copenhagen
Accord has introduced a nonbinding “pledge and review” mechanism where individual
countries define voluntary emission reduction targets to reduce GHG emissions (or
a correlated measure such as the carbon intensity of output) before 2020. Can this
emergent institution prove successful as a first stage to achieve the required global
cooperation? Some 100 countries have already associated themselves with the Accord,
of which 75 have also issued domestic goals for mitigation actions by 2020.
Against this background, this paper is concerned with the drivers of coopera-
tion among groups of unrelated individuals faced with a coordination game requiring
multilateral effort in order to reach a target and avoid losses to all members. Free
riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes of cooperation
breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are particularly severe in the
absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of sanctioning deviant behavior.
Unfortunately, solutions to global environmental dilemmas, like climate change, can-
not depend on coercion mechanisms, given the transnational effects of emissions. A
further complication is that addressing climate change requires large scale coopera-
tion, due to the ineffectiveness of unilateral action in the face of the global nature of
the problem. A growing literature however stresses the importance of non-economic
factors in explaining human behavior; therefore, instruments that go beyond the tra-
ditional incentives might prove effective in facilitating the task.
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Given the empirical nature of the problem, we address it by means of a controlled
laboratory experiment. To this end, we extend an experiment regarding a framed
threshold public goods game with distinctive features such as the climate change game
in order to take into account inequality and commitment as salient features of the on-
going debate over how best to share the “common but differentiated responsibilities”
of climate change. We have built upon the game proposed by Milinski et al. (2008)
to explore these further aspects that were not captured by the original design, and
that we deem important both at the theoretical and policy level.1 The original game
introduced two salient and distinguishing characteristics of the individuals’ attitude
towards risk and time. On the risk–aversion side, it sets itself apart from commonly
studied public goods games, as it involves investing in a public good (climate pro-
tection) in order to avoid a loss (hazardous climate change), rather than realizing a
gain. Concerning the time dimension, a relevant trait of the climate problem is the
tension between avoiding incurring immediate mitigation costs by not contributing to
the public good today, and the long-term preference for a sound environment.
Our focus here is on two further aspects that are, to our knowledge, absent in the
experimental literature: First, we explicitly consider how the game is perceived in
the presence of an asymmetric geometry for sharing the burdens of mitigation; that
is, differences in the endowments originating from contributions (or lack of thereof)
in the initial rounds of play are introduced in two treatments to convey the idea of
differential wealth and responsibilities to players. Such asymmetries in wealth and
carbon responsibilities among the actors, and the ensuing issues of equity referred to
in the Framework Convention on Climate Change – “parties should act to protect the
climate system” “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, Article 3.1), might
further impede coordination. Second, we empower players with the ability to make
nonbinding pledges before the actions are chosen. This is reminiscent of the current
climate negotiations where individual nations can make pledges in an uncoordinated
manner. While these announcements do not carry any enforceable commitments with
them, we postulate that they may facilitate the coordination among players.2
The experimental results show that the real-world features introduced in the game
have deep consequences on the coordination level. Both claims that the inequality
disrupts and the pledges help coordination are supported by the data. 70% of the
groups provided the public good in the symmetric treatment with pledges, relative
to 50% in the corresponding treatment without pledges; 60% successful cooperation
is obtained in the asymmetric treatment with pledges, while only 20% is obtained in
the corresponding treatment without pledges.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief discussion of related
literature along with the design of the present experiment, while Section 3 is concerned
with its theoretical underpinnings, followed by Section 4, which reports the main
results. Section 5 draws some concluding remarks.
1Refer to Section 2 for details about the original game and the one proposed here.
2See Bernasconi et al. (2010) for an experimental investigation of the role of expressive obligations
in public good provision.
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2 Experimental design
Most experiments on public goods utilize linear public goods games, where partici-
pants have the option to invest a fraction of their endowments in a public good by
means of a voluntary contributions mechanism (see e.g. Ledyard, 1994). Typically,
the returns to the investment are equally shared among the participants according to
the marginal per capita return. We depart from this standard formulation in many
ways, in order to create a setting which incorporates realistic issues faced by climate
change negotiators. First, the provision of the public good is sequential, as multiple
stages of contributions (10 rounds) are performed before the assessment of the group
effectiveness in preventing simulated catastrophic climate change. Second, the objec-
tive of the game is to avoid a loss rather than creating a surplus by contributing to a
public good (with higher group contributions leading to higher returns to the players).
Here players’ contributions to the public good make them collectively better off only
insofar they are sufficient to reach a threshold (€120). All contributions below (or
above) it are wasted, as they fail to secure the keeping of the private accounts by the
participants (or have no additional benefit if above the threshold). This feature leads
to the next salient one, concerning the probabilistic nature of the losses. To account
for the uncertainty involved in climatic change, the actions of the six players forming
the groups taking part in the game have consequences that are not deterministic. If
they collectively fail to reach the target required to provide the climate protection
public good, they will lose their savings on the private account (what is left of the
initial €40 endowment after the contributions to the public good) with a probability
of 50%. As both the climate threshold and the probability of the climate catastrophe
are known, the players’ primary challenge here is to coordinate their contributions.3
The probability of the climate catastrophe was chosen in the light of the results of
the experiment by Milinski et al. (2008), which shares with us the above departures
from standard public good games, and which we aim to enrich with features that will
be discussed below. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at their experiment. In
a nutshell, Milinski and his co-authors implemented the above setup, with individuals
deciding on each of the ten rounds of the game whether to contribute either €0, €2,
or €4 to the climate account, with each group being presented with one of three
different treatments corresponding to three probability of savings’ loss: 90%, 50%
and 10%. These yielded the following levels of success in avoiding simulated climate
change: 50%, 10% and 0%. That is with the highest stakes, due to the larger gains
in expected value from reaching the target, cooperation was highest and half of the
participating groups where successful in collecting at least €120, while only one group
out of ten succeeded in the 50% treatment and no in the one where failing groups
had only a small probability of incurring the loss. Note that the last result is not
surprising from a rationality standpoint, as a player contributing €0 in all rounds
would have expected earnings of €36 compared to earnings of €20 and €0 by following
the remaining two pure strategies of €2/round and €4/round contributions. Only in
3Scott Barrett theoretically examines what happens if these (and
other) conditions do not apply. For preliminary results see
http://cbey.research.yale.edu/uploads/Environmental%20Economics%20Seminar/Yale%20seminar%20paper.pdf
(access date July 12, 2010).
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the 90% treatment the social optimum coincides with the strategy of €2/round, as it
would lead to certain earnings of €20 if adopted by all subjects, compared to expected
earnings of €4 if all adopt the €0/round strategy and a certain outcome of €0 if they
follow the €4/round strategy.
Our basic experimental design closely follows the design of Milinski et al. (2008)
with six individuals playing together in a group, each endowed with €40. The players
decided in each of the active rounds of the game whether to contribute either €0 (“no
contribution”), €2 (“intermediate contribution”), or €4 (“high contribution”) to the
climate account. All groups were being presented with the probability of savings’ loss
of 50%. After each round the players were informed about all individual contributions
and the aggregate group contribution in that round as well as the cumulative past
contribution of each player and the group. As in Milinski et al. (2008), players
were assigned nicknames in order to keep their identity private. Since the focus of
this paper is to test in the lab for the role of inequalities in informing the debate
on climate change, we introduced a series of treatments aimed at capturing features
of asymmetry among participants in terms of wealth, past contributions and future
commitment announcements.
In order to induce subjects to perceive the inequalities among them as the result of
past actions, we modified the game described above by replacing the first three rounds
with three inactive ones where half of the group had only the option of choosing a
€4/round contribution, while the remaining three players could only select a €0/round
contribution. That is, rather than externally imposing different endowments from the
beginning of the experiment, players were all told they had the full €40 endowment
before the start, but witnessed through the first three rounds a growing divergence
between high and low contributors. As a result of these three inactive rounds, the
players begin the active play consisting of seven rounds with substantial “inherited”
differences: those who forcefully contributed €12 prior to round 4 had €28 left in their
private accounts, while those who previously did not contribute anything to the pub-
lic good found themselves with the entire endowment available for the ensuing seven
rounds. We call this treatment “Base-Fair” and we expect that this setup conveys
a sense of responsibility to the relatively wealthy players, as their position is due to
past free-riding. This situation is reminiscent of that of global CO2 emissions, with
developed countries owing much of their prosperity to past carbon-intensive industri-
alization, relative to developing countries with historically smaller carbon footprints
and wealth.
To single out the effect on coordination of the introduced asymmetry, a “Base”
treatment has been performed without such unequalizing redistribution. In it, sub-
jects go through three inactive rounds where they all have no other option than to
choose the intermediate contribution of €2 per round. These three inactive rounds
might render the intermediate strategy more focal; for a more in depth discussion,
refer to Section 3.2.
Finally, we implemented two treatments in which the subjects had the opportunity
to make future commitment announcements. The “Pledge” treatment introduced two
pledge stages to the symmetric case while the “Pledge-Fair” treatment implemented
two pledge stages in the asymmetric case. In both pledge treatments it was common
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knowledge that the pledges were nonbinding. The first pledge stage was after the
(fixed) first three rounds. The subjects simultaneously and independently announced
their intended contributions for the subsequent seven rounds. Afterwards the players
saw the “intended climate account” which contained the individual contributions from
the first three (inactive) rounds plus the individual pledges. Thereby they immediately
detected whether the intended contributions would be sufficient to avoid catastrophic
climate change. The second pledge stage took place after round seven. Similar to the
first pledge, the players simultaneously and independently announced their intended
contributions for the last three rounds and were subsequently informed about the
“new intended climate account” that included past contributions and the pledges.
Table 1 summarizes the key features of our experimental design and the number of
participants in each session.
The experiment was run in May 2010 at the MaxLab laboratory at the Univer-
sity of Magdeburg, Germany. In total, 240 students participated in the experiment,
whereby the pool consisted of a mixture of students with an economic or business
major (60%) and students with a non-economic major (40%). Most of the students
were experienced as they had participated in three or more experiments before (88%)
while only few students were inexperienced (12%). Sixty subjects took part in each
treatment. No subject participated in more than one treatment. Sessions lasted about
60 minutes. For each session, we recruited either 12 or 18 subjects using the ORSEE
software (Greiner 2004). Each subject was seated at linked computer terminals that
were used to transmit all decision and payoff information. We used the Z-tree software
(Fischbacher 2007) for programming. Once the individuals were seated and logged
into the terminals, a set of written instructions were handed out. Experimental in-
structions (see the Appendix) included a numerical example and control questions
in order to ensure that all subjects understood the games. At the beginning of the
experiment subjects were randomly assigned to groups of six. The subjects were not
aware of whom they were grouped with, but they did know that they remained within
the same group of players throughout the ten rounds. After the final round, the play-
ers were informed whether the group had successfully reached the threshold of €120.
Afterwards they were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. The questionnaire was
designed to elicit the players’ impressions and motivation during the game, as well
as the general opinion about climate change policy (see the Appendix). At the end
of the experiment, one of two table tennis balls was publicly drawn from a bag by a
volunteer student. If there was the number 1 on the ball, all players in the groups
that had not reached the threshold kept the money (that was left on their private
account). If there was the number 2 on the ball, these players lost their money. Out of
the 20 groups which did not reach the threshold 11 groups were in good luck and kept
their money while 9 groups were in bad luck and lost their money. No show-up fee
was administered. On average, a subject earned €17.23 in the games; the maximum
payoff was €40 and the minimum €0.
The money allocated to the climate account was used to buy and withdraw CO2
emission certificates traded in the European Union emission trading scheme (EU
ETS)4. If a group had successfully reached the threshold, all of the climate account
4For information about the EU ETS visit the European Commission official website
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Table 1: Summary of experimental design
money was used in this way. In case of a failing group only half of the climate account
money was used for emission certificates. Thereby, we introduced a specific field
context to the experiment which made the task more realistic and might increase the
participants’ motivation. The experimental instructions contained a short explanation
of the EU ETS and the above mentioned rules (see the Appendix). We announced
furthermore that the purchase and the suspension of certificates would be certified by
a notary and that the overall amount of certificates and the notarial acknowledgment
could be found on a specific website. Overall, we spent €3,248 for emission certificates
which corresponds to 212 tons of CO2 given a price of 15.3 €/ton.5
3 Discussion of equilibria
As noted in Milinski et al. (2008), the multiplicity of equilibria in the game makes
classification virtually impossible. The game utilized here is a modified n-person
stochastic threshold public goods game, with a total of ten rounds of which only
seven allow freedom of choice over the three possible actions. Given the choice of the
50% probability of loss, conditional on the group failure to collect €120, the inter-
mediate contribution of €2/round provides the same take home expectation than no
contribution, namely €20. This implies that any average round contribution above
€2 is irrational, in the sense of welfare diminishing relative to not contributing any-
thing. In fact, borrowing the wording from Milinski et al. (2008), “each course of the
game that leads to exactly reaching the target sum of €120, irrespective of who[m]
contributes how much as long as each player invests” at most €20, is a Nash equi-
librium. Of course, depending on the round and the path that has led to it, a high
round contribution of €4 bringing the individual sum above €20 may still be optimal
if successful in guaranteeing that past investments were not wasted.
Before commenting on the impact of the three computerized rounds in Section
3.2, we briefly discuss the tradeoffs inherent in the game.
3.1 Game tradeoffs
For illustrative purposes, we provide an hypothetical scenario in Table 2. Assume the
group has just completed round nine, with an aggregate contribution of €108 (i.e. they
are on track); assume further that four players stick to €2 in round ten, unilaterally
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm)
5For emission certificate prices visit http://www.eex.com/en. We thank UniCredit Bank AG,
Germany for assistance in the certificate purchase.
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bringing the account to €116. If the two remaining players were convinced, say due
to previous contribution patterns, that only the two of them would consider deviating
from the intermediate €2 contribution in the last round, they would be facing the
following figures:
Table 2: End payoffs (and corresponding final climate account values in parentheses)
to the row player given round-nine moves. Entries on or below the antidiagonal are
certain, while the starred entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of
account loss.
Ultimately, the decision depends largely, in this situation, on the degree of risk
aversion and on mutual expectations. We argue that a third driver of behavior should
not be overlooked, namely moral heuristics. In particular, especially if previous de-
partures from symmetric burden sharing introduced the need and led to altruistic
acts by some of the players, inequity aversion might motivate the latter to refuse
participation in an unfair outcome, even at a deer cost to them and the others. In
our experimental setting, we expect these situations to arise more frequently in the
treatments with initial unequalizing rounds, as they are likely to result in greater
disparities among players (due to the constrained behavior in the early rounds).6
Inequity aversion may be determinant in guiding the decision based on Table
2-type of scenarios. If for example a player is risk-averse but strongly resists disad-
vantageous inequity (has a high α parameter, in Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 terminology),
he or she will be unwilling to compensate for the actions of the risk-seeker(s).
Let’s return to the above example in order to evaluate how inequity aversion may
steer the end result towards successful or unsuccessful coordination. In its absence,
a risk-seeking player believing the opponent to be risk-averse (i.e. placing a high
probability on his/her choosing the high round contribution of €4), might be inclined
to take a chance and choose €0 in the last round. Symmetrically, a risk-averse indi-
vidual, say the column player, fearing to see the certainty of a gain jeopardized as a
result of free-riding, may well opt for contributing €4. In that case, the two contribu-
tions would offset each other and €120 would be reached (top right entry in Table 2).
This situation is reminiscent of the snow drift game, which differs from the prisoner
dilemma game in that unilateral action, while not as desirable as shared cooperation,
6See the discussion on group level patterns in Section 4.
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still provides a benefit to its pursuer. 7
However, if risk aversion is dominated by inequity aversion, the column player
may choose either the €2 or the €0 contribution, if believing row player to free-
ride, thus leading to the highly inefficient outcome represented by the top left and
top middle cells. Highly inefficient since they do not guarantee certainty of success,
notwithstanding the substantial contributions, which on average are close to €2/round
per player.
3.2 Impact of the computerized rounds
As discussed in Section 2, in two symmetric treatments the players witness three
rounds of unavoidable €2 contributions, while in the remaining two asymmetric treat-
ments the players undergo three unequalizing rounds resulting in half of the group
being wealthier than the remaining half. At the group level, independent of the treat-
ment, they contribute €36 to the public good before round four begins, keeping them
on track with respect to the threshold. What is the impact of this mechanism on the
attainable game equilibria? First of all, it makes the achievement of the threshold
collectively optimal as otherwise the already invested €36 would have been wasted.
Let us consider the case of symmetric contributions constrained to the intermediate
round contribution of €2. Of the two symmetric Nash equilibria from the setup in
Milinski (2008), corresponding to all players contributing either €2 or €0 per round,
the latter is no longer available. This difference may promote coordination, as the
unrecoverable individual contribution of €6 early in the game could in principle steer
away individuals from no contribution towards the intermediate contribution. 8
For what concerns the remaining two asymmetric treatments, both symmetric
Nash equilibria disappear, as not only the all selfish equilibrium is ruled out by the
first three rounds (although now three players do have the option to avoid any con-
tribution), but also the one where all players contribute €2/round. This happens
since half of the group begins round four with a sunk investment of €12, while the
remaining players are unbound. The difference with respect to the symmetric case
is stark, as it arguably introduces profound differences in the motivations of the two
subgroups to provide the public good. Those who had no choice but to contribute
30% of their endowment early on, may be more committed to going the extra step
to reach the target of €20 per person. The empirical question is: will the remaining
players be sufficiently committed?
Before turning to it, at the risk of oversimplifying the complexity of the 6-person,
10-round game, we present payoff matrices in Table 3, with the aim to highlight some
key characteristics of the game in Milinski et al. (2008) and in the present work.
The left matrix concerns the former, while the centre and right matrices respectively
7Kümmerli et al. (2007) argue for the omnipresence of these situations in human working life,
with the following example: “two scientists accomplishing a research project would each benefit if
the other invests more time than oneself in the writing of the paper reporting the collaborative work.
But if one of the collaborators does not contribute at all, the best option probably remains to do
all the work on one’s own.” We believe that these tradeoffs, which also apply to the sharing of the
global climate bill, are captured by the game analyzed here.
8In the experiment by Milinski et al. (2008), participants of the 50% treatment, which weren’t
bound to the fair amount in rounds one to three, contributed on average > €1.5/round. This suggests
that the selfish Nash equilibrium was not popular even in the absence of the discussed mechanism.
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Table 3: A coordination game situation: end payoffs (and corresponding final climate
account values in parentheses). Selfish refers to the strategy of giving €0 in each of
the active rounds (10 rounds in the left matrix, 7 in the remaining two), Fair to giving
€2/active round. While all matrices are based on an initial endowment of €40, in
the games introduced here the endowment before round 4 is either €34 for all players
(centre matrix), or alternatively €28 for “poor” row players and €40 for “rich” column
players (right matrix). Payoffs above the antidiagonal are certain, while the starred
entries are expected values based on the 50% probability of account loss.
summarize the outcome of interactions in the symmetric and asymmetric games in-
troduced here. For the sake of presentational clarity, we have simplified the analysis
by assuming that two subgroups of three players choosing the same strategy form,
effectively reducing the type of interactions to those present in the familiar 2x2 for-
mulation. That is, the three players in each subgroup act identically, as if they tacitly
coordinated on the same choices. Moreover, in Table 3 players can only choose be-
tween either free-riding in all active rounds (no contributions), or always contributing
the intermediate amount of €2/round.9 This simplification allows analyzing the game
as if it was a one shot game, where people simultaneously reason on the outcome from
picking one of two strategies leading to the corresponding group level Nash equilibria
(keeping in mind the above discussion on the no longer attainable Nash equilibria).
Comparing the three cases, we notice that, when choosing between no contribution
and the intermediate contribution in the respective games, best response behavior
leads to two pure strategy Nash equilibria where all players coordinate on either the
free-riding or the intermediate €2 strategy, irrespective of which matrix we consider.
However, while in the one simplifying the game in Milinski et al. (2008), both are
payoff equivalent, with the €2/round equilibrium being a weak Nash equilibrium and
the €0/round equilibrium being strict, in the symmetric game in the centre of Table
3 the intermediate contribution equilibrium is payoff dominant (and both are strict).
Lastly, in the asymmetric one, the intermediate contribution equilibrium is again
payoff dominant, although it is weak, unlike the no contribution equilibrium which
is strict. This analysis confirms that the games experimentally tested here can be
seen as coordination games of the Stag Hunt kind, with the trade-off between social
cooperation and safety being represented by the more rewarding €2/round strategy
versus the safer €0/round strategy, which does not require cooperation to succeed. 10
9It is important to stress again that, while the all fair-sharer equilibrium is present in all three
matrices (top-left cells), the one where all players choose the selfish act in each of the ten rounds
(bottom-right cell in the first matrix) is not preserved in either of the games introduced here. In
other words, due to the introduction of the computerized rounds, the €0 contribution is no longer
attainable in the remaining two matrices.
10Skyrms (2001), has the following interpretation of the game: “In the Stag Hunt, what is rational
for one player to choose depends on his beliefs about what the other will choose. Both stag hunting
and hare hunting are equilibria. [....] A player who chooses to hunt stag takes a risk that the other
9
Figure 1: Success rate by treatment
4 Results
The bird’s eye view on the cooperation level across treatments is provided in Figure
1, which reports the success rate in providing the public good of climate protection.
That is, for each treatment, it shows the percentage of groups who contributed at
least €120 to the climate account. Inspection of Figure 1 suggests:
a) the pledges are effective tools to ease coordination among group members;
b) inequality disrupts cooperation, and more severely so in the absence of the
pledges.
In the following three sections, we take a closer look at between and within treat-
ment differences, and find supporting evidence for the above claims, as well offering
explanations based on the underlying patterns.
4.1 Trajectories
Much of this section’s analysis is based on Figure 2. In it, the contribution trajectories
resulting from averaging those of the participants of the four treatments are contrasted
with the symmetric trajectory that would arise if all subjects chose the intermediate
€2 strategy, therefore collecting €12 per round. Note that each curve concerns eight
rounds, the first of which represents the group contribution in round three, set by
default at €36 for all treatments (see Section 2 for the experimental design), after
which each subject has the freedom to choose the round contribution between €0, €2
will choose not to cooperate in the Stag Hunt. A player who chooses to hunt hare runs no such
risk, since his payoff does not depend on the choice of action of the other player, but he foregoes
the potential payoff of a successful stag hunt. Here rational players are pulled in one direction by
considerations of mutual benefit and in the other by considerations of personal risk”. The game
analyzed here adds a further layer of complexity, as the option that doesn’t require cooperation to
succeed, namely the always defect strategy labelled Selfish in Table 3, is not entirely safe due to the
associated probabilistic payoff; Fair, on the other hand, is risky in terms of reliance on coordination,
but safe with respect to the ensuing payoff.
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Figure 2: The contribution patterns in each treatment, starting with round 3
and €4.
The experimental subjects displayed a significant amount of variation, with some
groups contributing little to the public good (the group that came closest to the no
contribution equilibrium collectively contributed only €12 in the seven active rounds),
and others surpassing the threshold (the maximum was €126). Nevertheless, each
treatment was characterized by substantial differences in terms of success rate in
simulated climate catastrophe avoidance. Five of the ten groups participating in Base
were successful, contributing on average €122.4, while the remaining five fell short by
contributing €70. The ten groups as a whole contributed €96.2 ± 32.5 (mean ± error),
as shown in Figure 2. As expected, the Pledge treatment proved effective in facilitating
coordination, even if based on nonbinding commitments; successful coordination on
the target increases to 70%, with all groups contributing €103.6 ± 29.6, stemming
from the €121.1 set aside by the seven groups who reached the target and €62.7 by
the remaining three.
The effect of introducing asymmetric endowments to the Base treatment is nega-
tive: compared to it, the participants of Base-Fair where 30% less successful (see Fig.
2). Interestingly, adding the possibility to make pledges again proved to be an ex-
tremely powerful tool to facilitate coordination on the threshold: Pledge-Fair groups
had a success rate of 60%, which is remarkably higher than the 20% achieved by
groups in the Base-Fair treatment (and 10% higher than that of groups participating
in Base, the symmetric treatment without pledges). In terms of average giving, as
evident from Figure 2, participants of Base-Fair provided €100.6 ± 21.8, which is
below the provision level in both pledge treatments (the highest across treatments
was achieved in Pledge-Fair, with 108 ± 21.8), reflecting the positive impact of the
pledges discussed above. Notably, this impact is higher when considering the asym-
metric treatments (+40% success rate from Base-Fair to Pledge-Fair), with respect
to the symmetric ones (+20% success rate from Base to Pledge).
What is not captured in these treatment-wise comparisons (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) is
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the differences in behavior between failing groups, which sheds light on the motivation
(or lack of thereof) to provide the public good of climate protection. While in Base
and Pledge failing groups provided only €70 and €62.7 respectively, failing groups
participating in Base-Fair and Pledge-Fair contributed a remarkable €95.5 and €88,
despite the lower success rate in the latter two (-30% in Base-Fair w.r.t. Base, and
-10% in Pledge-Fair w.r.t. Pledge, see Fig. 1). This evidence, together with ques-
tionnaire analysis, suggests that the role of the asymmetric endowments is twofold: it
disrupts cooperation by rendering more complex coordination, but the increased fail-
ure rate is not simply the result of a decision by a larger proportion of group members
to opt for a no contribution strategy in the hope of high earnings. Many groups in
these two treatments clearly tried to reach the €120 threshold until the last rounds,
therefore increasing average contribution relative to the failing groups in Base and
Pledge, who often behaved as if they tacitly agreed on gambling with the probability,
due to low contributions in the early rounds. In fact 6/8 failing groups (75%) in Base
and Pledge combined provided ≤ €70, while in the corresponding asymmetric treat-
ments only 2/12 failing groups (17%) provided ≤ €70. In other words, the inequality
undermined the groups’ ability to combat simulated climate change damage, but not
their motivation, which is actually higher than in symmetric treatments (cf. green
vs. blue and purple vs. red lines in Fig. 2).
4.2 Contribution dynamics
Taking a closer look at Base-Fair, an analysis of the dynamics of contributions pro-
vides a perspective on the patterns behind the high number of failures that charac-
terized this treatment. Figure 3 shows, for all treatments, the instances of €0, €2
and €4 contributions, respectively, in a given round. Note that, in order to have
comparable figures, round four is not considered in the chart, which instead focuses
on contributions in rounds five to seven and eight to ten.
Figure 3: Contributions in early and late rounds. Amounts invested in rounds 5-7
and 8-10 to protect climate in: (a) Base; (b) Pledge; (c) Base-Fair; (d) Pledge-Fair
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The trend shaping in Base-Fair between early and later rounds is quite pro-
nounced: no contribution instances increase on average by 32%, intermediate contri-
butions decrease by 14% and high contributions drop by 21% in the last three rounds.
This account explains the almost ubiquitous coordination failure among participants:
no contribution instances increase over time, while both intermediate contributions
and high contributions decrease over time, leaving little scope for catching up in the
final rounds.
Unsurprisingly, the two treatments characterized by the highest success rate,
Pledge and Pledge-Fair, owe much of it to the different dynamics, since contributions
in round four where similar across all treatments. Let us consider Pledge first: the
70% success rate is the result of maintaining the number of no contributions relatively
constant, having a high number of intermediate contributions, and compensating the
intermediate contributions decline with a 71% increase in high contributions in the
last three rounds.
Let us know take a closer look at the dynamics in Pledge-Fair and Base-Fair,
since both are subject to three unequalizing rounds at the beginning. Although the
number of no contributions in Pledge-Fair is higher in rounds five to seven relative
to Base-Fair, the number of selfish acts did reduce to 6.4 in the last three rounds.
For what concerns the €2 count, the differences are not stark, as in the six rounds
combined the Pledge-Fair participants chose this contribution level close to 14 times,
while the Base-Fair participants chose it 16 times. What ultimately proved to be
determinant for success were the number of high contributions, which in several in-
stances sufficed to offset the no contributions. We read this as improved coordination
stemming from a commitment that, while nonbinding, nevertheless was an impor-
tant vehicle of intentions among the participants. As noted before, such “lubricant
of cooperation” was particularly effective in the presence of inequalities, which pre-
sumably increased the complexity of coordination by bringing fairness issues to the
table, with potentially contrasting interpretations over the moral obligations stem-
ming from them (see Section 4.4). It should be noted that the subjects took seriously
the opportunity to express their planned contributions. In Pledge-Fair, for instance,
the average contributions are almost identical to the corresponding pledges: between
round four and round ten, contributions amounted to €72 and pledges to €71; in the
last three rounds, contributions amounted to €31.8 and pledges to €32.6.
So far we have only tangentially discussed contributions in the first active round of
play, namely round four. While, as noted above, variation across treatments is limited,
an interesting aspect is whether there are marked differences between average round
four contributions in failing groups with respect to successful ones. The answer is
yes: in all treatments success in the entire game is highly linked to contributions in
round four. The twenty groups that were able to coordinate to protect the climate
had average individual contributions of €1.9 (corresponding to €11.4 at the group
level), while the remaining twenty groups had initial individual provisions of €1.2
(corresponding to €7.3 at the group level). We therefore conjecture that the first
actions carry an important weight as they signal the members’ commitment in taking
quantifiable efforts early on. In terms of feasible trajectories to reach the €120 target,
this difference is a small burden, as it only takes slightly over one altruistic act in
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the ensuing six rounds to compensate the gap accumulated in round four between
successful and unsuccessful groups. Yet, we argue that this lack of early initiative has
deep symbolic value and explains the resulting differences in success rate. Such insight
is of relevance for the current climate negotiations, and reinforces the importance of
following up declarations with tangible action, especially among developed nations
with higher responsibilities.
4.3 Group level patterns
We will now inspect behaviour in certain groups that either displayed a recurring
pattern or one which is worth of notice. The first one considered in Figure 4 belongs
to the latter category. While the group, which took part in the Base-Fair treatment,
got off on a good start, mimicking the symmetric trajectory in rounds four and five
by providing €12 in each, and continuing to oscillate around this contribution level
until round nine (where they were actually ahead by €2 with respect to the symmetric
trajectory), a meagre €6 was contributed in the last round and the threshold missed
by €4. This extremely irrational behavior, in terms of departure from payoff max-
imization, seems to be the consequence of an unwillingness to further invest in the
climate account by those who contributed much in earlier rounds. The three players
with low initial endowment due to high contributions in the first three rounds, for
example, had already contributed €22 each on average by round nine, correspond-
ing to almost €2.5/round. Their reaction was to contribute €2 collectively in the
last round, presumably expecting the remaining three players to provide most of the
missing €10. However, the latter did not take on the entire burden, providing only
€4 collectively. This qualitative pattern took place in four of the forty groups in the
sample, providing €116 or €118 by the last round. All these instances took place in
treatments with endowment inequality, providing experimental evidence supporting
the hypothesis advanced in Section 3, on the important role of inequity aversion in
certain situations characterized by unequal burden sharing. We will come back to
this issue in Section 4.4.
A somewhat diametrically opposite scenario is the one depicted in Figure 4b,
where a group in the Base treatment was able to catch up, after lagging behind
the symmetric trajectory in previous rounds often by €8 or even €10. Thanks to
a remarkable effort in the ninth round, where all subjects contributed €4 with the
exception of one who contributed €2, the group surpassed the threshold in the final
round with a total contribution of €122. This qualitative pattern took place in two
more groups, which successfully rebounded back from either €102 or €104 in the
penultimate round.
The last two illustrations (see Fig. 4c and d), respectively taken from Pledge and
Pledge-Fair, represent two failed attempts of different nature. In the first, after round
seven all players abandoned hopes to provide the public good, due to the pervasiveness
of free-riding (15 no contribution instances in rounds four to seven), stopping at an
aggregate €56. This class of group behavior was the most frequent: 12/40 groups
‘abandoned the ship’ no later than in round seven, meaning that most subjects in these
groups did not make any contribution in the last three rounds, collectively providing
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Figure 4: Selected examples of: (a) late miscoordination; (b) catching up in last
round; (c) retreating early in the game; (d) still trying up to the end, but failing
at most €12. Notably, 67% of these instances took place in either Base or Base-
Fair, indicating that the pledges promoted a sense of unity among the participants,
since only 4/20 groups abandoned the ship in these treatments. The second case
differs in that the non-provision of the public good does not appear to follow from
an intentional decision to stop investment in the climate account. Three players, the
initially poor ones, invested €20 or more, while the remaining three rich ones still
contributed almost €11 on average (or almost €1.1/round), which is closer to the
intermediate contribution than to the free-rider one of €0/round. This is remarkable
since, as of round nine, having the group provided only €86, it was impossible to
reach the €120 target even if all had gone for the high €4 contribution. This suggests
high motivation to protect the climate by some members, as also found in Milinski
et al. (2008). In fact, in five groups at least one subject continued to submit positive
contributions until the last round, even if the target was beyond reach. Again, these
groups were not evenly distributed across treatments: 80% of them took part in one
of the two pledge treatments, suggesting a positive effect of the pledging ability on
motivation to protect the climate.
In addition to the cases discussed above, and depicted in Figure 4, a last one
deserves attention, due to its frequent appearance (9/40 groups) and theoretical rel-
evance, the group level Nash equilibrium. By it we mean that the group as a whole
successfully coordinated on a provision of precisely €120, whether or not the burden
was symmetrical shared among the members.11 In fact, only in two instances did
each member contribute €20 overall (one in Base and one in Pledge), and in one of
these they all played the symmetric strategy of always contributing €2. Braking down
these instances by treatment sheds further light on the positive role of the pledges as
11This is a loose interpretation of the definition of Nash equilibrium given in Section 3, which
requires symmetric behavior.
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a coordination mechanism: 6/9 Nash equilibria were achieved in pledge treatments.
4.4 Inequality
We have seen that inequality impede coordination among the players. Now we will
analyze in more detail how the groups in the asymmetric treatments Base-Fair and
Pledge-Fair handle the inequality and compare the handling between groups which
successfully reached the threshold and groups which did not. The successful groups
were strikingly effective in eliminating inequality. Both the rich players and the poor
players contributed on average precisely €20 to the climate account. Thereby, 92% of
the rich players and also 92% of the poor players gave €20 or more. In case of failure,
we do not consider the groups that abandoned the ship and decided to gamble but
only the groups that actually tried (but failed) to reach the target. In these groups,
the poor players paid on average €21 into the climate account while the rich players
gave only €16. Thereby, 83% of the poor players but only 28% of the rich players
paid €20 or more. However, the rich players did not completely refuse to invest. The
majority (83%) invested €14 or more. That means they were willing to reduce but
not to eliminate inequality. The poor players on the other hand were not willing to
accept inequality. Obviously the rich and the poor had different views on what is the
appropriate contribution for each type of player. In the end, the persistence in their
different viewpoints was crucial and caused the shipwreck of the group. We will come
back to this point later on when we discuss the questionnaire data. Interestingly, the
successful groups managed to eliminate inequality independently of whether they had
the opportunity to announce pledges. However, the pledges appeared to be of great
help since in the Pledge-Fair treatment 75% of the groups managed to eliminate
inequality and reach the target while in the Base-Fair treatment only 33% of the
groups managed to do so.
4.5 Questionnaire analysis
After the experiment subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire about the motiva-
tion for their contribution decisions during the game and their general opinion about
climate change (see the Appendix). Overall, the subjects appear to take climate
change seriously. About 5% of the subjects think that climate protection is currently
the greatest challenge in Germany. Out of 15 possible challenges for the German
policy, climate protection ranks sixth. However, the magnitude of the problem is seen
very differently: about 21% think that the problem of global climate change is being
rather overestimated, 35% think that it is being correctly estimated, 37% think that it
is being underestimated, and 7% do not know. The subjects also differently evaluate
the equity principles that may guide international climate agreements: 23% support
the polluter-pays principle, 22% support the ability-to-pay principle, 17% favor the
egalitarian principle, 22% prefer the sovereignty principle, and 16% support another
principle.
The summary statistics of the players’ motivation for their contribution decisions
during the game are more complicated because on the one hand we used open ques-
tions to elicit the motives and on the other hand the motives obviously depend on the
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respective group performance. The qualitative categorization of responses reveals that
the majority of players is primarily motivated by the achievement of the threshold
(43%), fairness considerations (18%), material self-interest (15%), and the past group
performance (14%). Understandably, the poor players in the asymmetric treatments
Base-Fair and Pledge-Fair care more about fairness than the rich players (22% versus
15%) and more about the past group performance (27% versus 14%). About 6% of all
subjects state that they are particularly motivated by the climate protection realized
through the purchase and retirement of the CO2 certificates. In the final round the
players are primarily motivated by the achievement of the threshold (42%), mate-
rial self-interest (18%), the hopelessness to reach the threshold (14%), and fairness
considerations (11%). The self-reported motives are in line with the actual behavior
in the game, e.g. people stating that fairness was the most important reason often
contributed €20 to the climate account while people stating the self-interest was their
primary motive mostly gave less than €20. The self-reported motives furthermore
help to understand why some groups did not reach the threshold. Comparing the
successful groups that reached the threshold and the groups that did not, fairness
considerations were more important for the successful groups (23% versus 13%) as
well as the achievement of the target (52% versus 35%) while self-interest (9% versus
20%) and the past group performance (8% versus 21%) were less important.
In order to elicit players’ fairness perceptions, the subjects in the asymmetric
treatments were asked whether they agree with the following statement: “Those who
began in round 4 with a starting capital of €40 should pay more into the climate
account in the following seven rounds than the other players”. Overall, 76% of sub-
jects agree with that statement, 10% disagree, and 14% neither agree nor disagree.
However, there are significant differences between poor and rich subjects: out of the
poor players, 90% agree, 5% disagree and 5% do neither of them while out of the
rich players only 62% agree, 15% disagree and 23% do neither of them. In another
question, subjects were asked “What would you consider a fair average investment
for the last seven (active) rounds for those beginning with €40 and for those begin-
ning with €28?” Possible answers include €0, €1, €2, €3, and €4. Almost all of the
poor players (95%) perceive €3 as the fair amount for the rich players while only
72% of the rich players share this perception. Similarly, only 23% of the poor players
perceive €2 as the fair average contribution for the poor players while 42% of the
rich players state that this would be the fair amount. These specific amounts (€3
for the rich and €2 for the poor) are particularly important because they reflect the
application of the different equity principles. In our game, the egalitarian rule, the
polluter-pays rule and the ability-to-pay rule are equivalent: According to these prin-
ciples the rich (and responsible) players should compensate for the inactive rounds
where they gained their wealth without contributing to climate protection. In order
to equalize the players’ contributions and payments the rich should contribute €20
in the active rounds, i.e. on average €3 per round. As opposed, the sovereignty rule
does not consider the players’ wealth or responsibility but rather requires the same
contribution during the active rounds, i.e. €2 per round for the rich as well as for the
poor players. In fact, a couple of rich subjects argued that the assignment of roles was
just bad luck or good luck and that the €2 contribution per (active) round and player
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was a fair burden sharing. Hence, our game as much as the real climate negotiations
allow for different notions of fairness. The players tend to pick the notion that is
in their best interest (“self-serving bias”) meaning that the implementation of that
notion would generate least costs for them. This self-serving bias in the perception
of fairness has been also observed in the real climate negotiations (Lange et al. 2010)
and it obviously deteriorates the chances for effective coordination.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have experimentally explored the relevance of equity and commitment
issues in affecting the subjects’ willingness to contribute to a public good framed in
terms of avoidance of catastrophic climate change. We have built upon the game
proposed by Milinski et al. (2008) to explore some further aspects that were not
captured by the original design, and that we deem important both at the theoretical
and policy level. In particular we have focused on: (i) introducing asymmetries
among players by means of a novel unequalizing mechanism in the first three rounds;
(ii) allowing players to make nonbinding pledges concerning future contributions. The
extended climate game empirically tested here captures trade-offs that are particularly
salient for the issue of climate change mitigation. It is a promising tool for analysing
such tensions notwithstanding its simplicity, as it provides insights into many aspects
that are crucial to climate change and coordination at large. Given the lack of scientific
consensus on who should bear the burden of mitigation costs, providing empirical
evidence on the driving forces behind coordination in a setting designed to mimic
inequalities and bargaining possibilities faced by actors involved with climate change,
should be fruitful also from a policy perspective.
The main purpose of the paper was to address the question: Will the most re-
sponsible actors contribute more to combat climate change damage in a public goods
game experiment where players differ in wealth (and responsibilities) and are allowed
to make nonbinding pledges? The empirical answer to this question is generally “no”:
initially wealthier subjects were often unwilling to compensate for past, “inherited”,
actions which had benefited them at the expense of the common good. Such resis-
tance, much to the frustration of the remaining subjects who expected initiative on
the part of the wealthy, accounted for the frequent coordination failures in the asym-
metric treatments. In all twelve instances (out of twenty participating groups) where
the target sum was not provided, there was an unfavourable contribution imbalance
for those who had been bound to the altruistic act in the first three rounds, who ended
up on average paying 60% of the bill. Not surprisingly, the burden was shared evenly
in the remaining eight successful groups, with both subgroups contributing 50% of
the sum.
While neither one of the new features introduced in the climate game alters the
game structure in terms of the group trajectory required to reach the threshold for
climate protection, they both have a significant impact on the groups’ success rate.
Asymmetries undermined coordination, especially in the treatment where subjects
had no signalling mechanism beyond contributions, in which 80% of the groups failed
to reach the target sum. Pledges, on the other hand, proved to be an effective lubri-
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cant of coordination, halving the percentage of failures in the treatment with endow-
ment inequalities. Both in the baseline and across all treatments, the rate of success
was 50%, a remarkably high level considering the instability of the fair share Nash
equilibrium and the previous findings of 10% cooperation by Milinski et al. (2008).
With respect to the latter, the higher coordination may stem from design and subject
pool differences (see Section 2 and the Appendix for details on the design and for
the complete instructions translated from German). As for the former, we argue, in
accordance to much of the experimental literature, that human behavior is guided by
a rich set of heuristics that may interfere with expected payoff computations, steering
decisions away from the rationality prescriptions. In Section 3 we have discussed two
such heuristics, risk aversion and inequity aversion; data and questionnaire analysis
suggest that both play an important role in explaining the observed departures from
best-response behavior.
The asymmetric geometry of global emissions introduces the possibility to argue
in essentially opposite directions on the grounds of fairness motives. Developing coun-
tries may insist on the importance of past emissions to justify their unwillingness to
take action, while developed countries can appeal to the relevance of current emis-
sions, generally higher in transitioning economies, to refute to take lead in mitigation
actions. These positions can be backed with different notions of equity: The egalitar-
ian rule, for example, incorporates the principle of equal per capita emissions, which
would demand drastic emission cuts in industrialized countries. On the other hand,
the sovereignty rule, which postulates the principle of equal percentage reduction of
current emissions, shifts more of the abatement burden to developing countries. Such
asymmetries may lead to “political lock-ins” that are detrimental to the establish-
ment of a global agreement to curb emissions (Halsnæs et al., 2007). However, equity
criteria might be also used by countries to influence the negotiations process in their
own material self-interest. Lange et al (2010) provide evidence that the perceived
support of different equity rules by countries is self-serving, i.e. purely tactical, and
can be explained by the ranking of their economic costs. The game introduced here
allows capturing relevant aspects concerning both the tension between collective good
and free riding on the efforts of others (e.g. benefitting from polluting activities with-
out internalizing the externality), as well as the potentially disruptive role of uneven
wealth and responsibilities arising from past activities. As to future research, the
extended climate game would be well suited to also shed light on the role of the
self-serving use of equity in climate negotiations.
The implications of our results for the ongoing policy discussions may be impor-
tant. Inequality further impedes coordination. An alignment of wealth and carbon
responsibilities might, on the other hand, facilitate coordination in addressing climate
change. This strategy, however, is seen as dangerous as it risks unconstraint growth
in emissions which might prove difficult to curb substantially in the future. Our anal-
yses concerning the faculty to make nonbinding pledges on future contributions to the
public good, however, showed that this institution promotes coordination and mit-
igates the problems arising from the above mentioned inequalities. Future research
might investigate the potential role of the “pledge and review” mechanism in the eco-
nomic catch up process in developing countries. That is, one could experimentally
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investigate the successfulness of a bottom-up approach based on delayed action by
parties that commit to a mechanism that ensures future emission reductions.
Although necessarily simple for the sake of tractability, the game presented here
is designed to incorporate key real-world issues, such as equity and the impact of
emergent institutions based on nonbinding “pledge and review” mechanisms. One
further salient aspect which is not captured by this game is that of uncertainty over
the magnitude of the threshold: future research is needed along these lines. More-
over, different games emphasizing mitigation cooperation over catastrophe avoidance
coordination would complement the present analysis.
Appendix
Experimental instructions for the treatments Pledge and Pledge-
Fair
Welcome to the experiment!
1. General Notice
In this experiment you can earn money. To make this experiment a success, please
do not talk to the other participants at all or draw any other attention to you. Please
read the following rules of the experiment attentively. Should you have any questions
please signal us. At the end of the instructions you will find several control questions.
Please answer all questions and signal us when you have finished. We will then come
to you and check your answers.
2. Climate Change
Now we will introduce you to a game simulating climate change. Global climate
change is seen as a serious environmental problem faced by mankind. The great
majority of climate scientists expect the global average temperature to rise by 1.1
to 6.4 degrees Celsius until the year 2100. There is hardly any denial that mankind
largely contributes to climate change by emitting greenhouse gases, especially carbon
dioxide (CO2). CO2 originates from burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil or natural
gas in industrial processes and energy production, or combustion engines of cars and
lorries. CO2 is a global pollutant, i.e. each quantity unit of CO2 emitted has the
same effect on the climate regardless of the location where the emission has occurred.
3. Rules of Play
In total, 6 players are involved in the game, so besides you there are 5 other
players. Every player faces the same decision making problem. At the beginning
of the experiment you will receive a starting capital (= EUR 40) credited to your
private account. During the experiment you can use money from your account or not.
In the end your account balance will be paid out to you in cash. You will be making
your decisions anonymously. To guarantee for this you will be assigned a nickname for
the playing time. The nicknames are the moons of our solar system (Ananke, Telesto,
Despina, Japetus, Kallisto or Metis). You will find your name on the lower left side
of your screen. During the course of the experiment you will be playing exactly 10
climate rounds. In these rounds you can invest into the attempt to protect the climate
and to evade dangerous climate change. Among others, dangerous climate change will
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result in significant economic losses which will be simulated in this experiment. In
each climate round of the game all six players will be asked simultaneously:
"How much do you want to invest into climate protection?"
Possible answers are EUR 0, 2 or 4. Only when each player has made his choice,
all decisions will be displayed simultaneously. After that the computer will credit
all invested amounts to an account for climate protection (“climate account”). At
the end of the game (after exactly 10 rounds) the computer will compare the climate
account balance with a predetermined amount (= EUR 120). This amount must be
earned to evade dangerous climate change. It will be earned if every player averagely
pays EUR 2 per round into climate protection. If this is the case, EUR 12 are be
paid into the climate account per round. If the necessary EUR 120 have been earned,
all players will be paid out the amount remaining on their private accounts. The
remaining amount consists of the starting capital of EUR 40 minus the sum paid
into the climate account. If the necessary EUR 120 have not been earned, dangerous
climate change will occur with a probability of 50% (in 5 out of 10 cases) and this will
result in significant economic losses. If this probability arises you will lose all money
left on your account and no one will be paid out anything. With another probability
of 50% (in 5 out of 10 cases) you will keep your money and will be paid out the
amount on your private account after the game. We will draw the probability by lot
in your presence. The payout will be made anonymously. Your fellow players will not
learn about your identity. Please note the following two particularities in the game:
First, the decisions of the six players in the first three rounds are predetermined by
the computer. Meaning, you - and your fellow players - cannot decide freely how
much you want to invest into climate protection in the first three rounds. You will
be offered an option instead which you have to choose.
Please note that the predetermined investments of the first three rounds will al-
ready change the amounts on the climate account and the players’ accounts! Starting
in round 4 you will decide freely which amounts you want to invest into climate pro-
tection. Second, all players can issue declarations of intent about how much they
want to invest into climate protection in the following rounds. The declarations are
not binding for the investment decisions in the following rounds. The first declaration
of intent is issued after round 3. All players will simultaneously state how much they
plan to invest into climate protection in the next seven rounds in total. When all
players have stated their declarations of intent, the “planned climate account” will
be displayed. The planned climate account shows the investments of each player of
the first 3 rounds plus the investments planned for the remaining seven rounds. After
round 7 all players will be given the opportunity to revise their declarations of intent.
All players then simultaneously state their planned total investments into climate
protection for the next three rounds. When all players have stated their declarations
of intent the “newly planned climate account” will be displayed. The newly planned
climate account shows how much each player has already invested in the first seven
rounds plus the planned investments for the remaining three rounds.
4. Example
In this example you see the decisions made by the six players in one round (round
6).
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The column on the right side (“Investitionen Runde 6”) shows the investments
made in the current round. Players Ananke, Telesto and Despina have not paid
anything into the climate account, whereas players Japetus, Kallisto and Metis each
have paid EUR 4. In total EUR 12 have been paid and by that been credited to the
climate account. The column in the middle (“Investitionen Runden 1-6 insgesamt”)
shows the total investments made by each player in rounds 1-6. Players Ananke,
Telesto and Kallisto each have paid EUR 12 into the climate account in the first 6
rounds. Despina has paid EUR 14, Japetus EUR 10 and Metis EUR 8 in the first six
rounds. By that a total of EUR 68 has been paid into the climate account.
The column on the left (“geplantes Klimakonto Runden 1-10”) shows the planned
climate account after the first declaration of intent. The value stated per player shows
the investments made in the first three rounds plus the planned investments for the
remaining seven rounds. Exactly this information will be displayed after each climate
round.
5. Usage of the Money on the Climate Account
If the necessary EUR 120 have been earned to evade climate change, we will buy
CO2 emission certificates of the total amount on the climate account and retire them.
If the necessary EUR 120 have not been earned, we will use half of the amount on
the climate account to buy CO2 emission certificates and retire them (we will keep
the rest of the money). By purchasing and retiring the CO2 emission certificates we
contribute to the abatement of climate change. We will now explain you how this
works: In 2005 the European Union has implemented the emissions trading system
for carbon dioxide (CO2). Emissions trading is the central instrument of climate
policy in Europe. It follows a simple principle: The European Commission, together
with the member states, has determined the amount of CO2 to be emitted altogether
in the respective sectors (energy production and energy intensive industries) until
2020. This total amount will be distributed to the companies by the state in the
form of emission rights (“certificates”). For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted, the
company has to give a certificate to the state. The certificates can be traded between
companies.
For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted e.g. by a power plant, the plant operator
has to prove his permission to do so in the form of a certificate. This leads to
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an important consequence: If the total amount of certificates is reduced, the total
emissions will be lower, simply because plant operators do not possess enough emission
allowances. That means if a certificate for one quantity unit is obtained from the
market and is being “retired” (i.e. deleted) the total CO2emissions are reduced by
exactly this quantity amount. The opportunity to retire certificates actually exists
in the framework of the EU Emissions Trading System. In Germany the German
Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) regulates Emissions trading. The authority
holds a retirement account with the account number DE-230-17-1. If certificates are
transferred to this account they will be withdrawn from circulation, i.e. deleted, by
the end of each year. ZEW has opened an own account at the DEHSt (DE-121-2810-
0). The purchasing and retiring of the certificates will furthermore be attested by a
notary public. Summarizing: if all players have for example paid a total of EUR 120
into the climate account, we will buy certificates for about 8 tons of CO2 (the price
per ton is currently at about EUR 15). This equals the emissions of a ride in a VW
Golf (1.4 TSI) one and a half times around the world.
6. Control questions
If you have finished reading the instructions and do not have questions, please
answer the following control questions.
a. Which total amount does each player have to averagely invest into climate pro-
tection in the 10 rounds to evade dangerous climate change (please tick the according
box)? O EUR 12 O EUR 20 O EUR 40 O EUR 120
b. Please assume that the necessary amount of EUR 120 to evade climate change
has been earned and you have invested a total of EUR 16 in the 10 rounds. How
much money will you be paid out? My payout is EUR ________.
c. In how many rounds can the players decide freely about their investments into
climate protection (please tick the according box)? O in 3 rounds O in 5 rounds O in
7 rounds O in 10 rounds
d. Please refer to the example stated under point 4 for the numbers. What do the
balances on Despina’s and Metis’ private accounts state? Despina’s balance states
EUR _________. Metis’ balances states EUR _______.
e. Please refer to the example under point 4 again. How much would the group
have to pay into the climate account in the next four rounds in total to abate dan-
gerous climate change (please tick the according box)? O EUR 12 O EUR 52 O EUR
68 O EUR 120
f. When do the players state their first declaration of intent and when can they
revise this declaration? First declaration after round: ______. Revision after
round: _______.
g. In your first declaration of intent after round 3 you are asked to state how
much you want to invest in climate protection in the following seven rounds in total.
If you want to invest averagely EUR 2 per round, which amount would you have to
state in your declaration of intent (please tick the according box)? O EUR 2 O EUR
12 O EUR 14 O EUR 20
h. Are the declarations of intent binding for the investment decisions in the
following rounds (please tick the according box)? O Yes O No
i. Please refer to the example under point 4 again. What do the figures in the
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left column “Planned climate account” stand for (please tick the according box)? O
the invested amounts of the first three rounds O the planned investments for the
last seven rounds O the invested amounts of the first three rounds plus the planned
investments for the last seven rounds
j. Please refer to the example stated under point 4 for the numbers again. Please
assume that all players adhere to their declaration of intent (see “geplantes Kli-
makonto”). Would the investments be enough to evade dangerous climate change
(please tick the according box)? O Yes O No
k. Please assume that the necessary amount of EUR 120 has not been earned.
With which probability will you lose the remaining amount on your private account
(please tick the according box)? O 10% O 30% O 50% O 70% O 90% O 100%
If you have answered all control questions, please signal us. We will come to you
and check the answers. After having checked the answers of all players and there are
no remaining questions, the game starts. Good Luck!
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Questionnaire
Table 4: Questionnaire and responses – Part I
25
Table 5: Questionnaire and responses – Part II
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